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Abstract 
 
Information fraud is a significant problem for modern firms. Firms may share 
information about vulnerabilities, but prior research into sharing has delivered mixed 
results. Most prior research work has examined sharing at the organizational level and 
we know little of the role of interpersonal relationships in security information sharing. 
This paper uses a case study of a large Asia-Pacific telecommunications provider to 
develop theory about interpersonal security information sharing. The results suggest 
that sharing is promoted by trust, risk and uncertainty, knowledge management and 
relationship factors. Investigators shared information partly to overcome tensions with 
other business areas and to ameliorate operational risk perceptions. Interpersonal 
relationships allowed sharers to benefit from complementary and specialist knowledge 
in other firms, thereby translating the meaning of fraud information between business 
environments. 
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Introduction 
Information fraud is a significant threat to the modern firm and its information systems (Im and 
Baskerville 2005). Identity theft, for example, has been termed, “the quintessential crime of the 
information age” (Kahn and Roberds 2008:251). Kallinikos (2005:188) argued that, “electronic ‘identity’ 
theft and fraud...are conspicuous unintended consequences brought about by the global interlocking of 
IT-based systems and artifacts”. Information fraud incidents can have average costs per incident to the 
firm as high as US$350,000 (Png and Wang 2009). Symantec (2011) cites costs to organizations of 
US$214 per compromised record. For these reasons, information fraud and security remains a key topic 
on the IS research agenda (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009).  
Prior research in IS has argued that firms might be able to better cope with information fraud by sharing 
information about vulnerabilities and attacks (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005). However, most of the published 
research into this sharing activity has illustrated negative consequences accruing to both the disclosing 
firm, and to related organizations in the industry. For example, Cavusoglu et al. (2004) observed a 2% 
drop in market value when firms disclosed information security breaches. When Heartland Payment 
Systems disclosed a breach in 2009, the firm lost half its market value (Frankland 2009) In 2004, 
ChoicePoint Inc. accidentally shared sensitive customer and credit card information with fraudsters 
posing as legitimate business partners (Hilley 2007), resulting in operational costs and fines of some 
US40 million (Culnan and Williams 2009). Inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information has also been 
associated with increased threat levels among banking institutions (Johnson 2008). Concerns over 
disclosing IT security information may also prevent firms from outsourcing their IT infrastructure (Ernst 
& Young 2008). By openly admitting to information fraud and vulnerability, firms risk eroding market 
confidence (Arora et al. 2008). Sharing information with customers and partners can also put the 
organization at greater risk of being compromised (Phua 2009). As perpetrators are now sharing 
vulnerability information among each other (McKinney 2007), it becomes more important to understand 
how organizations can share security information in light of these risks. 
Almost all prior research into the sharing of security information has focused on the organization as the 
unit of analysis. Very little research has yet explored human interaction in security information sharing 
(Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006), partly because gaining access to data at the individual level is difficult 
(Mahmood et al. 2010). If information sharing is often personal in nature (Staples and Webster 2008), 
then perhaps we need to look at security information sharing on an interpersonal level in order to see 
evidence of these sharing benefits. Evidence from recent practitioner literature emphasizes the 
importance of human actors and interpersonal ties in sharing security information to deal with these 
information vulnerabilities (PWC 2010, Ernst & Young 2010). However, we do not yet understand how 
these interpersonal relationships work. 
To begin exploring this area, this paper develops the foundations of a theory of interpersonal security 
information sharing between human actors. Using a revelatory case study of fraud investigators in a large 
telecommunications firm, we aim to investigate the factors affecting interpersonal information sharing. 
Our overarching research question is: 
What factors affect interpersonal security information sharing? How is security information sharing 
different to conventional information sharing? 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the study’s case research method and 
approach, followed by an overview of the case study’s multilevel context. The paper then explores the 
factors that affect this information sharing, integrating these findings with prior literature on information 
sharing. This is followed by implications for theory and practice. 
Research Method 
Our theory building approach begins with an overview of our case study organization and interviewees. 
Eisenhardt (1989:536) advises that "theory building research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of 
no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test". In this section, we provide an overview of our 
research method.  
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This study aimed to understand interpersonal security information sharing behaviors. Research into 
security-related topics is often confounded by problems of researcher access and trust, of identifying 
subjects and incidents, and the veracity of the data itself (Kotulic and Clark 2004). Accordingly, our 
overall research approach involved careful relationship-building with the participating organization, a 
major telecommunications firm in the Asia Pacific Region. We used an interpretive field study to build an 
understanding of processes and contexts (Walsham 1993, 1995) using the guiding principles of Klein and 
Myers (1999) to make sense of interpersonal security information sharing behavior in an organizational 
context. This case study was revelatory and previously inaccessible to investigation (Yin 2003) in that we 
were given significant interview, documentary and observational access to the firm’s fraud unit. This 
access helped us build a rich understanding of the processes at play. 
We held interviews with managers at TelcoFirm (a pseudonym), triangulating these with interviews with 
fraud managers at related organizations. Table 1 lists the interviewees and their host organizations. While 
the study focuses on the behavior of actors at a single case study firm, we also conducted interviews with 
sources outside the organization in order to triangulate our understanding of the external and inter-firm 
relationships. In some cases, interviewees were reluctant to be tape-recorded. In these cases, written 
notes were made during and after the interview. One participant wanted a list of questions in advance. We 
used observation and documentary material, such as new dealer sign-up forms, dispute resolution 
manuals, press releases and customer processing documentation to gather further evidence and 
triangulate our interviews. Fourteen interviews were held in total.  
 
Table 1 Interviewees and Organizations 
Interviewee Role Organization N. 
Fraud managers and investigators Case Firm 6 
Corporate fraud investigators and analysts Law enforcement 3 
Fraud managers Bank 2 
Fraud managers Competitor telecommunications firms 2 
Fraud manager Credit Card Provider 1 
 
We used a coding process to facilitate the convergence of indicators from our interview, observational and 
documentary sources (Yin 2003). The interview materials and other documentation were coded by hand, 
using open coding and conceptual sorting techniques. We developed and assigned textual coding labels in 
order to understand, describe and illustrate themes in these narratives (Ryan and Bernard 2000). As in 
Miles and Huberman (1999), we underlined the text fragments that reflected core constructs in the 
analysis. The researchers undertook the coding exercise with involvement from two fraud investigators at 
the case firm. Where confusion arose, the opinions of two other senior researchers were sought. A third 
senior academic checked the coding once it was complete. On the advice of Silverman (2006), we have 
preserved idiosyncratic and idiomatic expression within the interview quotes, in the interests of 
authenticity and credibility. 
Context 
In order to explain the factors affecting security information sharing, it is first necessary to understand 
the multilevel context in which TelcoFirm’s fraud unit operates (Walsham 1993).  
Industry Context 
The global telecommunications industry is large and highly competitive. Worldwide, telecommunications 
service revenue is in excess of $US1.7 trillion dollars per year, and growing (ITU 2008). The Asia-Pacific 
region alone has emerged as one of the world’s largest markets, with connection rates of more than three 
new users every second (ITU 2008). While telephony is important for communication, it is also 
increasingly a platform for ancillary services such as banking, purchasing and entertainment.  
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Firms operating in this industry share a number of characteristics. First, while some firms construct their 
own communications infrastructure, others lease communications lines from larger providers under 
wholesale agreements. Regardless of their local infrastructure arrangements, almost all 
telecommunications providers must network to some extent with telecommunications carriers in other 
countries. Some of these arrangements may be formalized, but many occur on an ad-hoc basis: a phone 
call between callers in two countries may traverse the telecommunications networks of several major 
providers. Second, telecommunications firms also act as intermediaries for other organizations, providing 
underlying infrastructure for telephone service and support lines to their customers. Third, 
telecommunications firms play a crucial role in servicing identity requirements for customers: not only do 
they provide customers with communications access, but they also provide them with written 
documentation in the form of connection notices and monthly bill statements to track this usage. These 
information artifacts are often used to prove a customer’s identity to other firms. Firms within this 
industry also engage in heated competition for lucrative customers. 
Organizational Context 
The subject of this study is TelcoFirm, a large foreign owned Australasian telecommunications carrier, 
employing more than 3,000 people. The firm offers a range of hardware products and 
telecommunications services to both private and business customers. These include conventional voice 
services, such as landline, long-distance and mobile voice communications, as well as data services such 
as broadband, mobile and dialup Internet access. These services are in addition to conventional 
telecommunications services such as reverse-charges and international trunk dialing.  
TelcoFirm sells its products and services both directly and through a network of agent dealers spread 
across the region. These dealers may be internal shopfronts, operated by the firm’s own staff, or privately 
owned retail businesses. 
TelcoFirm transacts with a number of other organizations in providing these products and services. For 
example, law enforcement groups periodically call upon the firm to provide account details and, in turn, 
the firm also reports some fraud cases to these police groups. The firm maintains an ongoing relationship 
with a national credit agency with which it transacts credit information: new account signups are checked 
against the credit agency’s database and, in turn, delinquent accounts are listed with this agency as 
necessary. These delinquent and doubtful debts are also insured against a large international insurance 
firm.  
The Fraud Unit Context 
The fraud unit within TelcoFirm is tasked with detecting and investigating security and compliance 
problems that affect the firm. In addition to assisting in setting policy, members of the fraud unit also 
work to identify vulnerabilities in the firm’s information systems, especially with regard to customer 
management. While the fraud unit is not a profit centre, it does compete for budgetary funding alongside 
other departments in the firm. A manager at TelcoFirm commented, 
“You know that if [top managers] don’t spend any money, they won’t detect anything. It’s 
as simple as that. Now no one wants to hear that their systems leak like a sieve so it really 
is easier to not discover it at all in the first place than to hush it up! So the [business] case 
you’re making is ‘if you give us X dollars then we may find something but we don’t know 
what yet’. And if you do find it you know they won’t like it anyway. Not many other 
[departments] are like that.” 
The fraud unit has two important roles with respect to fraud detection. First, it is tasked with detecting 
fraud in customer accounts and systems. Second, it also works to detect fraud among the firm’s employees 
and dealer network. As is the case with many modern firms, TelcoFirm takes a structured approach to 
new customer procedures, using a range of standard general and application controls to verify identity 
and intention at the account creation stage. These controls include written policies, physical and 
electronic access devices, user activity logging, semantic and syntactic data checks, application credit 
histories and identity verification checks. 
 Author1 Lastname & Author 2 Last name (or Author1 Last name et. al.) / Short Title up to 8 words 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 5 
In this capacity, the fraud unit was seeing between five and six new cases of fraud every day. Most 
information frauds fell into three categories, being identity theft, identity fraud and dealer fraud. 
However, the complexity of information fraud means that it is not always apparent which category of 
fraud a particular fraud event falls into. As an example, an identity thief had altered an account to feature 
a different residential address and telephone number. The perpetrator then used the account to gather 
further identity information (such as account statements) so that they could then continue the identity 
fraud with another firm at a later date. Shortly after the investigation began, the account was used as part 
of a call selling fraud. The complexity of this information fraud and the competition for funding within the 
firm means that investigative processes must be both effective and efficient.  
Factors Affecting Security Information Sharing 
The fraud unit shares information with internal and external groups, such as banks and law enforcement 
units. Investigation processes typically involved pieces of information from sources both inside and 
outside the firm. In this context, one bank interviewee recalled,  
“When I first came in...there were some banks who didn’t…openly share security [or] fraud 
information. And they were in the minority when I first joined. Now it’s recognized that at 
least with fraud and security issues, it’s not considered to be a competitive issue.” 
The analysis yielded evidence of a variety of factors affecting this security information sharing behavior. 
This section presents the findings of our analysis. For each factor, we present quotes that typify the 
responses with respect to that factor. 
Trust Factors 
Prior IS literature has identified trust as being important to information sharing (Staples and Webster 
2008). We saw evidence of various types of trusting behaviors in the interviewees’ responses, including 
cognitive and emotional trust, and suspicion and distrust. 
Cognitive Trust and Emotional Trust 
Some interviewees were acutely aware that they were placing trust in another party and had weighed the 
costs and benefits of doing so. For example, one manager at TelcoFirm described the trust that had 
developed over time based on prior experience,  
“In my experience trust matters more than the cards you’re holding. The other bloke may 
not know much right now but next week they may have it in spades. He, you know, may 
have insight you don’t have so it can be worth it to make that connection.” 
A fraud manager at another telecommunications firm described their relationship with investigators at 
other firms in the industry, saying, 
“Probably the best description [of our relationship] is ‘active trust’. We work closely with 
other units to get a better understanding of the state of play. And in turn we actively help 
them out too. It’s not, I guess, policy.” 
Cognitive trust contributed to information sharing by ameliorating perceptions about competitive threats. 
In some cases, interviewees perceived rational benefits in trusting information recipients, including 
competitors. 
Other descriptions of trust were more altruistic. In these cases, trust did not seem calculated, but rather 
aimed at improving welfare or out of general or personal interest. For instance, one manager recalled 
instances where managers had gathered socially to discuss interesting cases. Another manager said, 
“Sometimes you want to know and sometimes you come across one and you think ‘I know 
who’d like this one’.” 
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Suspicion and Distrust 
We saw evidence of suspicion in information sharing descriptions. We saw this suspicion as being 
conceptually different to trust because it reflected behaviors where sharers did not implicitly accept the 
veracity of their information sources or items (Gallivan and DePledge 2003). Distrust manifested itself in 
the ongoing relationships with information sources both within the TelcoFirm, such as other staff, and 
actors outside the firm, as one TelcoFirm manager described: 
“You know after a while you realize that you’re if you like implicitly disbelieving many 
things you hear. So, you know, at the back of your mind there’s this question, ‘who am I 
really talking to here?’.” 
This distrust appeared to affect many of the interactions involving the interviewees we spoke to. In this 
context, a banking fraud manager also remarked,  
“You can’t take what’s said at face value because you could be talking to the perpetrator. So 
what you’re saying is actually helping them out”. 
We also saw that investigators periodically distrusted the information artifacts themselves. For example, 
new accounts require at least one hundred “points” of identity documentation (such as a driver’s license 
or a bank account statement), with each piece of documentation worth a certain number of points. 
Investigators periodically appeared to distrust important information items, such as passports, because of 
prior information they had received: 
“So, you know, a passport from a foreign country for a new arrival within six weeks is 
worth a hundred points. We don’t know how they procure that, and we’ve heard only a 
presentation yesterday where people have been picked up with a boot-load of these 
passports coming out of foreign countries. So if that’s the case, and they’ve stamped a visa 
or whatever, that’s got an entry date within that six weeks, we’ve already created a 
connection with a false identity. So...we are not as comfortable with the documents 
anymore that give us any sense of comfort that we are in fact dealing with the correct 
person”. 
Distrust appeared to affect sharing of security information by compelling investigators to probe for more 
information in order to understand the security problem at hand. 
Risk and Uncertainty Factors 
The second set of factors related to risk and uncertainty. These factors included information uncertainty 
and operational risk and political uncertainty. 
Information Uncertainty 
Security managers shared information partly in order to reduce the levels of uncertainty inherent in the 
information they had available to them. Prior IS research has illustrated how security information sharing 
can be useful when information is incomplete or otherwise erroneous (Cavusoglu et al. 2008). This 
uncertainty was attributed first to the information itself. These respondent comments typified this 
finding: 
“So you come in and you have a note from a call centre op about an odd signup. So you look 
through what you have and you find a similar surname but it's not quite the same. Now is it 
their maiden name, or their married name, or maybe is it the call centre op who spelled it 
incorrectly, or did the caller not spell it right to begin with or is it somebody who is really 
trying not to show up on the books as easily?” 
“I can give you another example here that might help you out. We had one guy last year 
who was calling up to make a new account. And he’d call up to speak with an agent on the 
phone and he kept calling back until he got one that didn’t speak English so well or had a 
really…broad accent. And that was the agent he tried it on with. And so he also put on an 
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accent and it kept changing and he’d speak quickly and then get a bit, you know, uppity. So 
in that case what you have on file might only be half right. Or not even that.” 
In addition to the information itself, there was also uncertainty about the source of the information, such 
as a customer, a staff member, a dealer or another organization. These comments typify this finding: 
“You’ve got financial service providers who are technically a bank, but they don’t have face-
to-face contact. They do it all online, but they rely on the identification of the other bank for 
their process. Therefore they don’t have to store that, they don’t have to hold it, they don’t 
have to verify it. They know that…the bank has set up this client, and maybe it was ID fraud 
to start with. But they’re out of the loop. They can just do the transaction. But that gives the 
fraudster an opportunity to move money through that financial institution into somewhere 
else, so it creates a larger delivery.” 
“There’s still so much fraud happening within the dealers, and I mean, what we can’t 
understand is how can someone have their ID stolen, and then someone else go in and 
connect a phone, and they’ve got a photo, you know, and the dealers are connecting them. 
So, they’re doing it, and at the end of the day, they’ll probably get more money by doing it 
than what they know we are going to claw…back. So, you know, they take the risk.” 
Operational Risk and Political Uncertainty 
While a small amount of prior research has examined a link between risk and security (such as Wang et al. 
2008), very little IS research has illustrated a link between information sharing as a reaction to 
operational risk and political uncertainty. We saw several types of operational risk at play. First, the 
number of transactions each day, sometimes involving significant sums of money, contributed to an 
elevated perception of operational risk. Comments from a banking respondent typified this awareness: 
“With Internet banking products, the business basically grossly underestimated the amount 
of fraud that they anticipated. I think the total fraud they anticipated for the whole year 
was suffered in the first attack.” 
A fraud manager at another bank made similar comments, 
“All our retail products, all our business products, other products, in terms of say, stock-
broking, insurance. I think…basically every product or service that we offer would...be 
effectively targeted by ID fraud.” 
Reducing operational risk depended on sharing information between internal groups. However, 
coordinating information sharing in this way was difficult because of the political uncertainty of dealing 
with information fraud events and investigators. For example, one banking fraud manager described the 
political difficulty of acquiring the information the fraud unit needed from other actors in the firm. For 
example, a telecommunications fraud investigator discussed gathering fraud information from customer 
management staff, noting: 
“Well it’s not their job, I guess, and they have other things they...are told to do. I suppose, if 
you like, their paycheck doesn’t depend on who they catch out creating an identity or 
something like that. They have a senior and an upper manager on that business line who 
they have to report to first…you have to take what you can get.” 
Extraneous events could affect the sharer’s ability and intention to share sensitive information. Several 
respondents described the potential negative effects of drawing attention to vulnerabilities when these 
issues are already well known among industry insiders. For example, a comment from one banking 
manager highlighted the politically sensitive nature of some fraud information, saying,  
“If someone sets up false name accounts, using false identity, and in fact the business is 
obtaining business from it because they are not setting out to defraud us, but they are just 
laundering money through us, you know, that’s the other issue. You know, that’s good 
business for them, to have high value clients like that, that are pushing lots of money 
through.” 
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Knowledge Management Factors 
The third set of factors affecting interpersonal information sharing related to knowledge management. 
These factors included the need to balance tacit and explicit information, and social construction and 
translation of meaning.  
The Need to Balance Tacit and Explicit Knowledge 
We saw evidence of sharers working to balance the availability and accuracy of tacit and explicit 
knowledge in the firm. The TelcoFirm fraud unit and those at other firms typically recorded the fraud 
events detected in the firm, along with the investigative information used to detect the fraud. This 
response typifies this finding: 
“You know [the credit card providers] collect quite a lot of information on fraud losses and 
they share that with us so we can benchmark our progress compared to other banks 
nationally, in Asia-Pacific and internationally.” 
However, outside TelcoFirm’s fraud unit, recording of explicit fraud information was more thin. For 
example, one telecommunications fraud manager noted, 
“They’re not capturing information around [identity fraud], except probably in an 
anecdotal [fashion] in handwritten notes or perhaps it’s even over the telephone, and it’s 
never written down, never captured [as] identity fraud. And there’s a lot of anecdotal 
evidence around, you know, customers calling and saying, as part of the interview process, 
‘look I had a strange call last week from someone from [a company] and I gave all this 
information’.” 
The lack of explicit information outside the fraud unit appeared to be due to a variety of reasons. For 
example, one manager was concerned about misuse of data: 
“When we are talking about verification of ID on a day-to-day basis…we have to rely on 
management controls we have in place to identify people, say over the phone, and I think 
wherever that information is available internally … where it’s recorded on our systems for 
our verification, you’ll have issues with staff obtaining that information and then selling it, 
or at least providing it to third parties for use.” 
Sharing information with other fraud units helped fraud managers to overcome the lack of explicit 
information available to them. Another manager noted,  
“It’s more by sharing of tacit information than it is from strict data analysis, that says 
‘there is a vulnerability here’.” 
Social Construction and Translation of Meaning 
Information items on their own did not always yield an understanding of the particular information fraud 
at hand. A respondent from a credit card provider noted,  
“This is where our challenge lies in that some things are quite obviously ID fraud in that, 
you know, false applications for credit cards and so forth, you are giving false names or 
whatever the case may be. But with the other types of fraud, that will be a little more 
challenging in order to try and quantify from our end.” 
We saw evidence that managers shared information in order to glean insight from other managers and to 
develop understanding. For complex information frauds, this sharing interaction appeared to be an 
exercise in constructing understanding through mutual social interaction. For example, one manager 
recalled, 
“So your product-centric model dictates what info you collect. And to you, a bunch of errors 
on the Internet channel might just be a, say, slow Grandma with problems. But a mate over 
at [a bank] down the road can say, ‘are they happening on the hour?’. You know, ‘are they 
happening each hour? Are they like this or that?’ and that helps you figure it out.” 
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In socially constructing the fraud landscape, sharers were able to translate the meaning of information 
items for each other. Whereas a piece of information might carry a particular meaning to one actor, 
sharing the information allowed another actor to provide an alternative interpretation of the information. 
In this way, actors were able to translate information so that it yielded new knowledge about a problem. 
For example,  
“And he might say, ‘I can tell you what that means, that’s normal from [that country] 
because they haven’t signed up to this or that’. So you see in your neck of the woods, a 
problem might mean one thing but across the road it means another. Even, you know, once 
you’ve been in this game as long as I have you still learn new things like that.” 
Relationship Factors 
The fourth set of factors affecting sharing related to relationships. These factors included tensions with 
other business lines, relationship quality and reciprocity, relationship complementarities and 
specialization, and citizenship, personal involvement and pride. 
Tensions with other Business Lines 
Fraud detection was not always compatible with core business because compliance came secondary to 
creating new accounts for legitimate customers. This incompatibility created tension between business 
lines. For example, one respondent described the effect of improving customer signup procedures at the 
expense of tighter operating controls: 
“There were social engineering techniques involved…through our call centers at first, 
because it was a new product or service and our call centre staff were scripted to bend over 
backwards to help our customers and because of the fact that a lot of customers were 
calling in saying ‘I can’t remember my password’, ‘I don’t know’, and it’s new technology.”  
Another interviewee commented on the problem of notifying external groups of data breaches and other 
information security threats, saying, 
“Marketing would jump up and down if we were to send things like that up to the general 
public.” 
Tension also arose due to the amount of information that was distributed around the firm, based on the 
configurations and interconnections of legacy information systems. 
“And the fact that identity fraud crosses across all products and all services, does make it a 
little difficult…who owns that, who needs to know? Internet banking and telephone banking 
are jumping up and down wanting, you know, similar sorts of information because they 
have infrastructure. It’s around identifying customers over the phone, and they’ve got 
procedures...that support that product. Those product owners are interested in knowing 
‘well are my call centre staff failing?’, you know, ‘are my procedures correct?’” 
Sharing information alleviated this tension by allowing the fraud manager to gather information from 
other sources that were not as closely related to these core business lines. 
Relationship Quality and Reciprocity 
Sharing between actors was not indiscriminate. Relationships developed over time allowed interviewees 
to better ascertain the likelihood of successful, reciprocated sharing (also observed by Constant et al. 
1994). While interviewees acknowledged that there were situations where some firms had no information 
to distribute, one fraud manager revealed that in these instances,  
“It becomes known throughout the industry quite quickly who’s playing ball and who’s not. 
It can work the other way, you know.” 
Another manager relayed an example of how a new market entrant had chosen not to share some useful 
security information in a recent investigation, saying,  
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“We knew within 24 hours where everything had gone and we gave them a call and said, 
‘what’s happening?’. We all could have saved some money there but they chose not to play 
ball. Next time, they’ll probably find doors closed.” 
Relationship Complementarities and Specialization 
Complementary data arrangements also typified inter-actor sharing. Whereas one sharer may possess one 
information item, they may lack another item that could be useful for the case at hand. Information 
sharing allowed these actors to seek out sharing opportunities that provided these complementary 
resources, effectively benefiting from the data collection methods at other firms. One bank fraud manager 
described this broad-ranging information in terms of complementarities between sharers, saying,  
“Fraud areas are set up in a sort of product-centric model. So it depends on the product and 
how people have planned information gathering around that product. So we have good 
information around false applications for credit cards. We have good information around 
our Internet banking. But the other products, I think it’s fair to say, we wouldn’t have a lot.” 
A manager at TelcoFirm argued,  
“We have controls in place that detect part of the picture, for example high tolling or hot 
destination flags, but to get enough of the picture, we’re often reliant on other industry 
members.” 
In part, these relationship complementarities were driven by data specialization at different firms. Fraud 
units in different industry areas collected different information items and validated them in different 
ways, and sharing allowed fraud units to take advantage of these alternative data collection lenses. A 
manager at another telecommunications firm noted, 
“It’s a data collection issue – what data can you collect, what are you allowed to collect and 
what you should collect are different things. And of course you can only work, I guess, with 
what you have. So you’re hamstrung, I guess, not just by what you have but what, say, 
billing and accounts or HR have.” 
Another manager at a bank made similar comments, arguing, 
“It’s about data in the sense that you can only collect so much. So you’re building your 
knowledge and you go to the person who would know.” 
Citizenship, Personal Involvement and Pride 
Interviewees demonstrated high levels of prosocial citizenship behavior (consistent with Constant et al. 
1994). These interviewees were personally involved in the fraud detection function within their firms. 
Some interviewees had had prior careers in law enforcement, which had provided useful contacts and 
experience. Prior law enforcement experience also appeared to offer a de facto vetting of managerial and 
security credentials.  
“You know, I think it’s more about being a good person, than catching crims [criminals]. It’s 
like if you saw someone on the street being roughed up, you’d help. And all the guys I know 
are like that.” 
Forming these relationships lead to norms that were implied in the interactions between investigators. 
For instance, we observed that the sharing process sometimes involved a degree of personal etiquette, as 
one TelcoFirm manager mentioned, 
“Some Johnny newcomer ringing up and expecting things to be done out of contract or 
asking for things and favors will be disappointed.” 
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Reflecting on Security Information Sharing 
Prior research in IS has argued that information sharing is critical to the performance of firms (Arnold et 
al. 2010) and teams (Rafaeli and Ravid 2003), yielding richer insight into tasks and activities. Despite the 
apparent benefits of information sharing, prior research has observed barriers to sharing between 
organizations and individuals (Constant et al. 1994). Among these barriers are concerns over loss of 
power (Bock et al. 2005) and threats to confidentiality (Gil-Garcia et al. 2007). These barriers may lead 
firms to restrict their sharing, or distort the information they provide lest it fall into the hands of 
competitors (Li and Lin 2006). To compound this problem, some information types do not lend 
themselves well to open and transparent sharing. An example of this type of information relates to 
security: rich information about perpetrators, fraud events and security issues would be very useful in 
detecting and prosecuting fraud; however, such information is typically highly sensitive and may damage 
the firm financially and reputationally should it fall into the wrong hands. This type of information is 
critical to reducing risk and improving confidence in organizational settings. 
While a significant amount of prior work has examined the sharing and disclosure of security information, 
very little work has examined the role of human actors in the organizational context. Our contribution in 
this paper is to examine this human lens (Im and Baskerville 2005). Figure 1 presents a summary of the 
factors affecting interpersonal security information sharing that were identified.  
 
 
The interpersonal relationship lens shows how actors can overcome some of the barriers to organizational 
sharing of security information theorized in prior literature. For example, one barrier to sharing in prior 
literature has been concerns over opportunism and misuse of competitive position (e.g. Zafar and Au 
• Tensions with other Business Lines* 
• Relationship Complementarities and Specialisation 
• Relationship Quality and Reciprocity 
• Citizenship, Personal Involvement and Pride 
Relationship Factors 
• Need to Balance Tacit and Explicit Knowledge 
• Social Construction and Translation of Meaning 
Knowledge Management 
Factors 
• Information Uncertainty 
• Political Uncertainty and Operational Risk* 
Risk and Uncertainty Factors 
• Cognitive Trust and Emotional Trust 
• Suspicion and Distrust 
Trust Factors 
Security Information Sharing 
* indicates a factor that has not been extensively researched in prior information sharing literature 
Figure 1 Summary Model of Factors Affecting Interpersonal Security Information Sharing 
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2009). Fostering interpersonal trust and relationships could alleviate this concern by helping sharers to 
better anticipate and identify the end user of their sensitive information. Similarly, reciprocal 
relationships with actors at other organizations could also alleviate concerns over free riding of non-
sharers (e.g. Hausken 2007) by allowing sharers to assess the quality of the relationship. Citizenship 
behaviors and personal involvement in information sharing could overcome concerns about 
confidentiality (e.g. Ghose and Rajan 2006) and vulnerability signaling (e.g. Arora and Telang 2005) by 
helping sharers to be more certain of keeping sensitive information away from particular (internal and 
external) groups. 
The interpersonal lens on sharing also highlights the value of knowledge actors working together to solve 
problems. We saw evidence of human actors working together to develop shared approaches to poorly-
defined and ad-hoc problems (Nicolaou and McKnight 2006). These joint arrangements were beneficial 
because they provided both parties with information on the problem’s parameters over and above what 
they could each expect to glean on their own (Rowley et al. 2000). In prior IS research, this joint problem 
solving has lead to cost efficiencies in outsourcing arrangements (Lee et al. 2004) and theorized benefits 
to system selection through joint economic activity (Chatfield and Yetton 2000). By solving these security 
problems jointly with other firms they can obtain more information about the security problem than they 
would have on their own (Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak 2008). Accordingly, we saw lower levels of dollar loss 
and time exposure when both internal and external information sources were used than when the firm 
used internal sources alone. Interpersonal sharing could also contribute to some of the sharing benefits 
theorized in prior literature, such as understanding offender behavior (e.g. Cavusoglu et al. 2008) and 
being able to identify new attack vectors (e.g. Slagell et al. 2005). 
With respect to conventional information sharing, the interpersonal sharing lens also yields a finer 
understanding of inter-firm sharing behavior. For example, the analysis showed that security and 
operating information items were not necessarily compatible between firms. These items constituted 
boundary objects because they possessed different meanings for each stakeholder (Star and Griesemer 
1989) when they were extracted from their original contexts (Lindgren et al. 2008). Information sharers 
hence became information translators (Pawlowski and Robey 2004), converting meanings between each 
other based on their own specialization and operating environments.  
The interpersonal lens also shows that the firm is a collection of actors who are not always united in 
distributing information. While tensions with other business lines and political uncertainty could impede 
information gathering by preventing the fraud unit from acquiring the information they need, these 
factors could also affect sharing by compelling fraud investigators to seek out information from other 
sources. 
Implications for Research and Practice 
We used a revelatory case study of a large telecommunications firm to build a theoretical understanding 
of the factors affecting security information sharing. The study used interviews to develop a set of factors 
affecting interpersonal security information sharing. Our investigation has several implications for 
information security sharing arrangements.  
In order to replicate these security information sharing benefits in other firms, sharing hubs ought to 
foster trust-building between investigative teams in order to support inter-firm relationships. By focusing 
on the relationships, rather than mandating sharing activity, these hubs would allow firms to build ties 
with parties that have similar norms (Wang and Haggerty 2009). Such activities could include, building 
competence beliefs (McKnight et al. 2002), improving signaling or engendering benevolence (Ridings et 
al. 2002) or furnishing endorsements (Lim et al. 2006).  
The evidence in this paper revealed the exchange of tacit, proprietary information over interpersonal 
networks. Whereas some prior work has argued that human actors are the least secure point in a system 
(Perry 1985, Vroom and von Solms 2004), this paper indirectly finds evidence that human actors can also 
be of tremendous advantage in the detection process, particularly when given the benefit of effective 
information sharing networks. Human actors can provide tacit insight into a fraudulent case, using 
suspicion and ‘gut feelings’ to determine veracity. 
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Security controls are integral to maintaining IS performance. Prior literature has theoretically 
conceptualized alternative forms of information sharing postures. This study has contributed to this 
discourse through advancing theory on the nature and behavior of information security controls in an 
empirical setting (Im and Baskerville 2005). The research has presented an alternative perspective, where 
practice within a private sector context actually relies on removing competitive barriers for successful 
information system control and security performance.  
A number of steps were taken to ensure research integrity and quality, following the principles of Klein 
and Myers (1999). We used prepared protocols to guide the interviews, we conducted multiple interviews 
inside and outside the firm and triangulated interviews with other evidence where possible, and we 
discussed the case context in depth. Despite this, the study may be open to a number of limitations. First, 
the interviews in this study were conducted with operational staff and were based on observed or detected 
criminal activity. Such detection may not be perfect and, as a result, the cases and phenomena brought to 
light may exhibit some unseen bias. This limitation is likely to affect many qualitative studies into fraud of 
this nature. This study used a single, revelatory case where the phenomenon has hitherto been 
unobservable (Yin 2003) and it is necessary to view these results as being grounded in an examination of 
a large telecommunications company operating within a highly competitive and often unpredictable 
environment. Although this is quite familiar territory for most telecommunication markets globally, the 
applicability beyond the case firm of the evidence presented in this paper requires further exploration. In 
this regard, further work is also needed to distinguish causal factors from symptoms in the model. 
A number of avenues for future work arise. Interviewees saw significant benefit and little cost to sharing 
security information with external firms, including competitors. In addition, there was some evidence of 
perceived costs associated with not sharing information. This finding adds a new dimension to the theory 
presented earlier in this paper, in that the modern firm may be penalized for maintaining a closed 
information security posture. Further empirical research would be a useful complement to this prior 
theoretical work. 
This study emphasized the importance of social solutions to security problems. Echoing the advice of 
Siponen (2005), more research work into socio-technical and social controls for identifying risky behavior 
would be valuable. Greater understanding of ongoing behavioral relationships might improve perpetrator 
apprehension rates, while reducing the need for audit processes and other technical controls.  
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